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WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT-
A FREAK OUT?
ROGER S. BARRETT* AND CHRISTIAN T. JONES**
The Wisconsin Consumer Act' is a freak departure from the
normal. It is a product of ambivalent, prohibitive and punitive
thinking, combined with ambiguous language. It is difficult to
know what the act actually says and it is difficult to guess what
the drafters actually meant to say. Minds, reasonable as well as
unreasonable, differ. There is no general or common understand-
ing of important provisions which are conditions of lawful con-
sumer credit contracts. Most reasonable attempts by creditors to
comply may result in severe civil and criminal penalties and disci-
plinary action by the Banking Department.
It is unfortunate that the drafters of the Wisconsin Act chose
to deviate so greatly from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and
to ignore the lessons which have been offered by the National
* Roger S. Barrett of the Chicago Bar is a graduate of the University of Minnesota Law
School. 1934: Vice President and Special Counsel of Household Finance Corporation:
Editor of Consumer Finance Law Bulletin, 1947- , published by Law Forum of National
Consumer Finance Association. One of ten Industry Advisors to the Uniform Commission-
ers' Special Committee on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
** Christian T. Jones of the Chicago Bar is a graduate of the University of Northwestern
La% School. 1968: attorney, Household Finance Corporation: co-author with Mr. Barrett
of"Summars of State Consumer Credit Laws and Rates", published January, 1973: Mem-
her ol" Consunmer Finance Law Bulletin Committee.
In preparing this article, the authors have been assisted by Mr. Heiser's critical analysis
of the WCA. appearing in this review (p. 389).
The authors also have the benefit of the searching symposium in the February, 1973,
Wisconsin Bar Bulletin, by David J. Stute, staff counsel of the Wisconsin Legislative Coun-
cil; John S. Holbrook, Jr., Lawrence J. Bugge, and W. Pharis Horton, attorneys for some
affected creditors, and Erich Mildenburg, economist and lawyer who is currently Wisconsin
Commissioner of Banks. Messrs. Barrett and Jones will not repeat information which is
provided by the Wisconsin Bar symposium and by Mr. Heiser.
I. Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. Laws ch. 239 § 3688 (1971) (codified at Wis. Stat.
§§ 421.101-427.105 (1971). [tHereinafter referred to as the WCA]. The WCA also affects
the operation of the following Wisconsin Statute sections: § 138.05-Usury Law,
§ 138.09-Discount Loan Law, § 138.10-Pawnbrokers, § 138.12-Insurance Premium
Financing. § 218.01-Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Law, and § 218.04-Collection
Agencies.
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.' Already
serious problems have resulted.'
This article will summarize the code. It will also indicate some
features of the Wisconsin Consumer Act which are generally de-
structive to consumer credit.
ORIGINS OF UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code is recommended by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association. The Commissioners' recommendations are based on
their five-year study of existing state consumer credit laws. They
were aided by an expert staff and by an Advisory Committee of
21 members selected from public interest and industry groups.'
The Commissioners' drafting committee was not biased toward
credit users or credit grantors or any particular element of con-
sumer credit. The public interest was well represented at the meet-
ings of the Advisory Committee with the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. Ten Advisors were public interest spokesmen
including two experienced state regulatory officials. Ten Advisors
represented a cross-section of credit grantors including licensed
lenders, merchants, sales finance companies, and banks. Public
interest observers included the Director for Legislative Affairs of
President Johnson's Committee on Consumer Interests and the
Director of Debt Analysis of the U.S. Treasury Department. The
thirteen Commissioners on the Committee who drafted the Code
including six law Professors, three lawyers in general practice, a
Judge, and two bank attorneys.
The Uniform Commissioners sought to reach a common un-
derstanding between the public interest representatives and the
industry representatives concerning consumer credit problems and
the reasonable regulations to solve these problems. Their aim was
to draft an adequate but balanced law which would make consumer
2. See Uniform Consumer Credit Code (West 1968) [Hereinafter cited as UCCC].
3. tlome Loan Snag Growing Critical. The Milwaukee Journal, March 22, 1973, p. I.
GOP Delays Bill to Unsnarl 500 Home Loans. The Milwaukee Journal, March 28, 1973,
p. I. Amendmtent scalates Fight on Mortgae Snarl, The Milwaukee Journal, March 30,
1973. p. 26. Impeach Lucev. Lorge Thunders, The Milwaukee Journal, March 30, 1973, p.
I .
4. For an early history of the Russell Sage Foundation's Model Uniform Small Loan
La%% and early steps toward credit codes, see F. Hubachek, 16 U. Ci. L. REV. 609 (1949).
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credit readily available on terms which are reasonable from all
points of view, especially credit users and credit grantors.
By 1971, the Code with some variations had been enacted in
six states.' Oklahoma and Utah enacted it in 1969.1 Colorado,
Idaho, Indiana, and Wyoming enacted it in 1971. 7 The Kansas
Code enacted in May, 1973, is based on a recent redraft which the
Commissioners' Code Committee has under consideration for fur-
ther study but which has no official standing.' The Code is pres-
ently being considered by legislatures or study committees in other
states. Statutes modeled in part after or containing some features
similar to the Code have also been enacted in Alabama9 and
Louisiana."'
The official Code recommended by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws is the Code approved by the National Conference
on July 30, 1968, plus amendments adopted in 1970 to qualify
transactions regulated by the Code for exemption from the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act. There is no expectation that any redraft will
be considered by the National Conference in 1973.
OVERVIEW OF THE CODE VS. WCA
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code as proposed creates one
overall regulatory law to replace all existing state consumer credit
laws. I In general, the Code regulates credit extended to individuals
up to $25,000 (larger amounts when real estate is involved). How-
ever, this is an oversimplification since the precise scope of the
Code cannot be stated in a few words. Consumer credit as defined
by the Code is loan and sale credit to individuals for personal,
family, household, or agricultural purposes. The definition also
includes a purchase of a home or farm when there is a charge for
the credit or the credit is payable in installments. The Code would
regulate all consumer credit as defined for amounts up to $25,000.
Consumer leases would also be regulated in many respects but not
as to maximum rates. The Code would also regulate any amount
5. See. Report on Variations to Code in Enacting States, (West 1972).
6. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14a, .g 1-101-9-102 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 70B §§ I-
101-9-103 (1969).
7. Coo. Riv. STAT. ch. 73, . 1-101-12-103 (1971): IDAHO CODE tit. 28, §§ 31-
101-39-108 (1971): BURNS ANN. IND. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 21-101-26-203 (1971); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-1-101--40-9-103 (1971).
8. KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 16a, §§ 1-101-9-102 (1973).
9. CoDy OF ALA. Ruc.joip. tit. 5, §§ 316-341 (1971).
10. WFST'S LA. STAT. ANN. .§ 9:3510-9:3568 (1973).
11. See UCCC. .§ 1.108, 9.103, comments.
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of consumer credit, over or under $25,000, which is used to pur-
chase a home or farm or is secured by real estate. 12 When the
debtor is an individual, certain portions of the Code including those
concerning maximum rates would apply to credit for business pur-
poses up to $25,000.'1: Unless real estate is involved and the debtor
is an individual, the Code would not regulate consumer credit
which exceeds $25,000.'1 However, the $25,000 size limit is subject
to increase if there is a 10% increase in the Consumer Price Index
for Urban Wage Earners compiled by the United States Depart-
ment of Labor.'
The Code repeals all consumer finance and installment loan
laws, sales finance and revolving credit laws, usury laws, and laws
regulating insurance premium financing, home repair financing,
and second mortgages on homes. The Wisconsin Consumer Act,
however, would continue, in effect, separate statutes which regu-
late licensed lenders, motor vehicle dealers and financing, and in-
surance premium financing as well as the general usury law. In
1973, Wisconsin enacted an additional separate law as to real es-
tate loans." These separate laws must be read with the WCA to
find not only the appropriate maximum rate but also other regula-
tory requirements. The Code rates (but not the WCA rate) would
replace various maximum rates, including special rates for banks
and licensed lenders and also special rates for savings and loan
associations. The proposed revision has alternative provisions
which would either repeal or not repeal existing credit union
rates.
17
The Code fixes the same maximum rates for all types of con-
sumer credit grantors. The maximum rates for installment credit,
consisting of loans and sales, are 36% per year on the first $300,
21% per year on the next $700, and 15% per year on the remainder;
but when these graduated rates yield less than 18% per year, the
maximum is 18% per year. These rates also apply to open end
contracts for cash advances. 8 The rates for open end credit sales
are limited to 2% per month on the first $500 and 1- % on the
12. LJCCC , 2.104 and 3.104.
13. IL 8 2.602. 3.602.
14. Id. 2.605, 3.605.
15. Id.§ 1.106.
I1. Wis. LAws 1973. ch. 18.
17. See note II %uqra.
18. LJCCC § 2.201. 3.201, 3.508.
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remainder."0 the minimum charge for installment contracts is $5
for credit up to $75 and $7.50 for larger amounts. The minimum
for revolving credit is 50 a month."0
In the case of installment contracts, the flat annual rate which
yields the same dollar amount as the graduated rates for a particu-
lar amount of credit and payment schedule may be charged in lieu
of the graduated rates .2 The permissible flat annual rate for con-
tracts payable in 12 or more monthly installments would be 33%
per year for $500, and estimated 25% for $1,500, and an estimated
18% for $5,000, but the maximum rate would not be less than 18%
per year. The Code rates or the flat annual equivalents (or lesser
rates) could be charged on actual unpaid balances or precomputed
on scheduled balances according to the actuarial method. A pre-
computed chirge would be subject to rebate for prepayment in full
or refinancing according to the Rule of 7822 and to additional
charges for default or deferment. 21 In terms of annual dollar add-
on rates, maximum precomputed charges would be approximately
$20.50 per $100 for $300, $14 per $100 for $1,500, $10.30 per $100
for $5,000, and $10 per $100 for larger amounts.
The Code rates seem higher than they really are because they
include many charges which have been traditional extra charges
under general usury laws. The Code prohibits extra charges for
credit investigation, services, expenses, brokerage, "points", and
many other charges, in addition to the maximum rate. The broad
definition of "loan finance" and "credit service" (sales) charges
makes the Code rates comparable to the inclusive maximum rates
imposed by early small loan lawsY However, the creditor may
charge (1) for credit life and disability insurance if the debtor
requests it in writing after the creditor discloses the charge to him
1). See UCCC prefatory note to the volume and comment to § 2.201.
20. See note 18, supra, and UCCC § 2.207.
21. See UCCC comments to § 2.201.
22. The Rule of 78 is the popular name of a recognized mathematical formula by which
a linance charge contracted as a lump sum (precomputed, discounted or added on), is
prorated according to balances and periods of time scheduled by contract. Omitting details
as to the effects of delinquence, deferrals, irregular payment schedules, prepayments in full
not made on installment dates and other problems, the mathematical rule of 78 formulas
for equal monthly payment contracts may be briefly stated as follows:
The required rebate for prepayment in full is that proportion of the original finance
charge which the sum of the monthly balances scheduled to follow the prepayment
in full hears to the sum of all monthly balances scheduled by the contract.
23. UCCC § 2.203, 3.203, 2.204, 2.210, 3.210.
24. IdL at k§ 2.109, 3.109.
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in writing, and (2) for property and liability insurance if the credi-
tor discloses the charge in writing with a statement that the debtor
may choose his own insurer. Other extra charges are limited to fees
to record security and documentary taxes except that the Adminis-
trator may approve charges which are not for credit. 5 The maxi-
mum rates do not limit annual credit card charges if the card is
honored by at least one hundred merchants not related to the credit
card issuer, nor the discount at which the credit card issuer pur-
chases the debtor's obligations from merchants."
The Commissioners recommend these rates in combination
with other regulatory features of the Code. Their purpose in rec-
onmending these rates is to set ceilings and not to fix rates. In
brief, they believe: (1) The Code rates are necessary to provide
credit to the least credit-worthy now in the market, (2) In practice,
charges for most consumer credit will be set by competition rather
than by the Code rates, (3) The Code provisions for disclosing
finance charges in dollars and annual percentages facilitate com-
parative shopping which is the most effective means of limiting
prices, (4) Rate ceilings should be the same for all types of con-
sumer credit grantors, (5) Different rate ceilings for different types
of credit grantors (as in the past) segment the market, reduce
competition, and introduce rigidities into the market that benefit
a few creditors at the expense of others and work to the disadvan-
tage of consumers, and (6) A "combination of too low ceiling rates,
too substantial restrictions on creditors' rights and remedies, or too
great enhancement of debtors' rights or remedies, might deprive
the less credit-worthy of lawful sources of credit and drive them
to 'loan sharks' and other illegal credit grantors in whose hands
they will enjoy no legal protections.''27
The maximum rate set by the Wisconsin Consumer Act is
much less than the maximum rates recommended in the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code. The WCA sets a general maximum rate
of 18% a year on the first $500 and 12% per year on the remainder.
The WCA maximum applies to all bank consumer loans and to
credit purchases of household goods and services (both open-end
25. Id. at k§ 2.202. 3.202. Under the Redraft, additional charges may be made for real
cstatc "closing costs". "Closing costs" are included in the finance charge under the UCCC
to determine whether the maxinmum rates have been charged, but excluded from any pre-
computed linance charge to compute a rebate of unearned charges and excluded for disclo-
'ure purpo'seN.
26. h& at 2.303(l)(c), 3.109(2).
27. See note 21. stqora.
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and closed-end), but the WCA maximum does not apply to li-
censed lenders, motor vehicle and farm equipment dealers and
insurance premium financers. Separate statutes set different maxi-
mum rates for each of these categories. In general, these separate
maximum rates are greater than the WCA rate but less than Code
rates although in the case of older used motor vehicles, the rates
for installment purchases exceeding $5,000 (approximate) may be
higher than the Code rate.28
Besides maximum rates, the Code has significant regulatory
provisions as to balloon payments, 29 security, 0 garnishment 3' and
other creditors' collection remedies; 32 unconscionable or fraudu-
lent conduct;:" a "cool-off" period for door-to-door sales;34 re-
ferral sales; :5 rescission of contracts secured by the debtor's
home;: and bfficial surveillance and enforcement by an Adminis-
trator.37 There are heavy civil and criminal penalties for violations
of the Code.:38 Provisions against enforcing extortionate credit
extensions by judicial process facilitate federal prosecutions for
extortionate practices under Title II of Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act.3 9
The official Code has detailed requirements as to contract dis-
closures and advertising similar to the requirements of the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act.4" Required disclosures for installment credit
include the dollar amount and annual rate of finance charge, the
dollar amount of insurance and other non-finance charges, a de-
scription of insurance coverages, a description of security, the pay-
ment schedule, and descriptions of charges for default or defer-
ment, and the rebate of finance charge in case of prepayment in
full. The dollar amount of the finance charge for credit to purchase
a home need not be stated when the annual rate does not exceed
28. WIS. STAT. §§ 218.01(6)(b) (4), 422.201(4) (1971).
29. UCCC §§ 2.405, 3.402.
30. 1i. at 2.407, 2.408, 2.409, 3.510.
31. Id. at §§ 5.104. 5.105.
32. i. at § 2.403, 2.414, 3.405, 3.407.
33. 1&. at § 4.106, 5.108, 6.111.
34. Id. at S§ 2.601, 2.605.
35. Id. at § 2.411.
36. I(L at § 5.204.
37. IL at § 6.105 el seq.
38. (. at §§ 5.202, 5.203. 5.204, 5.301, 5.302.
39. Id. at § 5.107.
40. IdL at §§ 2.301, 3.301. The Redraft would omit the disclosure provisions and attempt
to incorporate the federal requirements into state law by reference.
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10%." Advertising which states the amount of the finance charge
must state the annual rate of charge and the payment schedule.
Advertising which states a rate of finance charge must state the
rate in terms of a flat annual interest rate, except that revolving
credit rates may be stated in graduated form." The Administrator
would have broad rule-making authority "to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that a prospective debtor will be able
to compare" from among credit grantors. 3
The WCA, on the other hand, relies primarily on the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act and federal regulations and enforcement to
obtain disclosure of contract terms.
The Code would exempt 75% of wages and a minimum of 40
times the federal minimum hourly wage from garnishment,44 pro-
hibit garnishment of wages before judgment,45 prohibit wage as-
signments," prohibit deficiency judgments for credit sales when the
cash price is $1,000 or less,47 subject the purchaser of credit sales
contracts to defenses which the credit buyer may have against the
merchant,18 and prohibit or limit attorneys' fees in collection
suits.' !' There is also a prohibition against employers discharging
employees because their wages are garnished to collect a consumer
debt." The WCA has additional restraints on creditors' collection
remedies which will be mentioned later in this article.
The Administrator under the Code would have broad enforcing
authority as to all types of consumer credit grantors. He may
investigate any merchant or sales finance company which he has
reason to believe has violated the Code and examine as a matter
of right any lender who charges more than 10% per year (12%
under proposed revision).5' He could enforce the Code by regula-
tions, 52 cease and desist orders,53 and court injunctions.54 He could
41. It. at 2.306, 3.306.
42. I. at §§ 2.313, 3.312.
43. Id. at § 6.104.
44. Id at § 5.105.
45. I at § 5.104.
46, Id. at § 2.410. 3.403.
47. i. at § 5.103. I fthe purchased goods cost $ 1,000 or less and the creditor repossessed
them, the purchaser is not personally liable for any unpaid balance. The creditor who
obtain% judgment %% ithout repossessing purchased goods in which he had a security interest
ma) not Ie% on purchased goods which cost $1,000 or less.
48. I. at § 2.404 (alternatives A or B).
49. it. al §§ 2.413, 3.403 (alternatives A or B).
50. I at § 5.104.
5i. i at § 3.506. 6.106.
52. id at§ 6.104.
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obtain injunctions against unconscionable or fraudulent conduct,
but he could not predetermine by regulation or finding that partic-
ular conduct is unconscionable or fraudulent.15 All consumer credit
grantors (merchants, lenders, sales finance companies, and super-
vised financial organizations) must file written notification with the
Administrator and pay an annual fee."6 In addition, lenders who
charge more than 18% a year must either be licensed or be super-
vised financial organizations such as banks, credit unions, savings
and loan associations or similar institutions under state or federal
supervision.57 Before issuing a license, the Administrator must find
after investigation that the lender's financial responsibility, charac-
ter and fitness warrant belief that the lender will operate his busi-
ness honestly and fairly within the purposes of the Code.58 In addi-
tion to the Administrator, a Consumer Credit Advisory Council
appointed by the Governor would also be established. 9
The enforcing authority of the Wisconsin Banking Department
is equal to the enforcing authority which would be delegated to a
Code Administrator. However, the authority delegated by the
WCA to the Banking Department could result in arbitrary admin-
istrative action if it were exercised by an unwise or biased person.
Finally, debtors have individual rights to enforce the Code in-
dependent of the Administrator's enforcing authority. Debtors
may recover civil penalties and attorneys' fees from creditors for
excessive charges, for failure to disclose charges as required, and
for certain other violations."°
The Code does not specifically authorize consumers to bring
class actions against creditors to recover civil penalties for alleged
violations. Unlike the Code, the WCA specifically authorizes bor-
rowers to bring class actions to recover civil penalties for alleged
violations of prohibitions and requirements many of which are
ambiguous and open to two or more reasonable constructions by
competent attorneys. This unwise feature of the WCA will be dis-
cussed later in this article.
53. Id. at § 6.108.
54. Id. at§ 6.110.
55. Id. at§ 6.111.
56. Id. at § 6.201, 6.203.
57. Id. at § 3.501. Under the Redraft, the requirement that lenders be either licensed
or supervised financial organizations would apply where the rate exceeds 12% a year rather
than 18%.
58. Id. at § 3.503.
59. Id. at § 6.301-6.303.
60. I. at §§ 5.202, 5.203, 5.205.
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THE CODE IS PRO-CONSUMER
The Code would impose a vast array of prohibitions, limita-
tions, and administrative discipline on credit grantors. It is clear
that the Code is a pro-consumer protection law. Nevertheless, the
Uniform Commissioners knew that there must be a reasonable
balance between pro-consumer protections and the rights of credi-
tors. In their Prefatory Note to the Code, the Commissioners de-
clared:
[The Code] provisions governing ease of entry into the market,
uniform disclosure of costs and terms, rate ceilings, restriction
of creditors' rights and remedies, enlargement of debtors' rights
and remedies, and powers granted to the Administrator are so
inextricably interrelated that any substantial change in one area
requires a major review of the balance struck in all other areas.'
The Commissioners sought to accomplish the balance by allowing
credit grantors adequate finance charges, by allowing them legiti-
mate collection remedies, and by stating the requirements for le-
gality as clearly as could be stated for the first time in a new and
innovative legislative proposal. Contrary to this, the drafters of the
WCA did not allow adequate finance charges. Their curtailment
of collection remedies went beyond what was reasonable. They
were ambiguous in their terminology. The drafters offered the Leg-
islature a hodgepodge of specialized definitions, prohibitions, and
limitations along with high pressure, anti-business propaganda.
The hodgepodge defied comprehension within the short time that
the Legislature had to consider it."2
WISCONSIN CONSUMER ACT-DESTRUCTIVE PROVISIONS
The drafters of the Wisconsin Consumer Act failed to use clear
and unambiguous language. They failed to give sufficient consider-
ation to the economic effects of restrictive provisions. The Legisla-
ture recognized this failure when it delayed the effective date of the
law from March 28, 1972, the date of approval, until March 1,
1973. The delayed effective date was to allow time for corrective
amendments and for study by the Legislative Council. Three
corrective bills have already been enacted, two before the March
61. d. a l p. XX.
62. .1. DIavis. Legislative Restrictions of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case Stud;'
ol theV egotiaion and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act. 72 Micti. L. RFV. 1, 7-
12 (1973).
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I deadline' :' and the third on April 19.64 In recognition of the
ambiguities found in the WCA, the Legislature authorized the
Banking Department to issue interpretations of the Act which
would relieve creditors from penalties which might otherwise be
imposed for hypertechnical violations of ambiguous provisions.
Under this authorization the Banking Department proposed 62
clarifying regulations of which 47 were adopted. The Staff of the
Legislative Council has also suggested many clarifying
amendments. .
Thus, it is becoming increasingly clear that the WCA is so full
of ambiguities that compliance will be extremely difficult.
The economic consequences of unwise restrictions on creditors
are also being recognized. By enacting Senate Bill 364, the Legisla-
ture recognized that the WCA did more harm than good to pur-
chasers of homes and to purchasers of securities. Senate Bill 364
enacted three exemptions from the provisions of the WCA. Feder-
ally insured consumer loans are exempted from most of the WCA.
First mortgage real estate loans are shifted to a new and separate
statute unless the rate exceeds 12% a year. Responsible people
declared that the WCA had made Wisconsin real estate mortgage
loans unmarketable.
Senate Bill 364 completely exempted obligations to licensed
securities dealers. It is not likely that the Legislature had a con-
scious intention to impose the restrictions of the WCA on the
purchase of stocks and bonds from licensed security dealers. Even
so, a specific exemption was required-either to relieve security
margin accounts from unwise restrictions or to correct a drafting
error. The unexpected effects of the WCA on margin accounts for
security purchases suggest that the drafters either did not know
what they were doing, or knew what they were doing but formed
no balanced judgment about it. Throughout the WCA there are
other destructive provisions which may have resulted either from
drafting errors or from lack of balanced judgment. Often it is hard
to discern whether the differences are errors in drafting which
produced unexpected effects or errors ofjudgment which produced
intended effects. The remainder of this article will attmept to show
examples of each.
63. Wis. Ass. Bit.i.s 355, 432: SENATE Bii. 364 (1973).
64. WIs. SINATI: Bi 364 (1973).
65. _, Stggestions fior Changes in the Wisconsin Act (Dec. 1972).
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DRAFTING ERRORS-DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITIES-
HUMPTY DUMPTYS
Drafting errors resulting in destructive ambiguities start with
the specialized "Humpty-Dumpty" 66 definitions. In section
421.301, standard dictionary terms which have habitual meanings
become redefined "Humpty-Dumptys." They are distorted, over-
stuffed, and understuffed by the Act to mean more or less, or both
more and less, than their dictionary and commonly accepted mean-
ings. Professor Reed Dickerson, a Uniform Commissioner from
Indiana and drafting expert, says:
The temptation to use a "Humpty-Dumpty" definition is of
course, strong. . . . At the same time it would be hard to find a
better example of the penny-wise-pound-foolish approach.
Like ghosts returning to a haunted house, established
connotations return to haunt the user who attempts to banish
them. The draftsman who has resorted to this slovenly device has
often forgotten his special definition and reverted unconsciously
to the established sense, thereby introducing either an unintended
result or an intended result disguised as something else.67
The worst "Humpty-Dumptys" found in section 421.301 are the
redefinitions which distort the meanings of "merchant,"
"customer," "creditor," "lender," "services" and "consumer
credit transaction." They not only confuse, surprise, and trap the
reader, they also enlarge and/or narrow the scope of the WCA in
unexpected ways. For example, the strange definition of "mer-
chant" in combination with other Humpty-Dumptys includes not
only merchants who are really merchants but also lenders, banks,
insurance companies, credit unions, small loan companies, credi-
tors, assignees, manufacturers, lessors, and brokers. "Merchant"
therefore, may include and thereby regulate security dealers, doc-
tors, dentists, and lawyers without even mentioning them. The
"Humpty-Dumptys" specifically define services to include and
thereby regulate transportation, cemeteries, and tombstones, but
exclude common carriers who have filed tariffs and all insurance
66. See L. CARROii., TIROUGH TIM LOOKING-GiASS, Chap. 6; Part of the exchange
between Alice and the EGG went as follows: The EGG said to Alice in scornful tones,
'*When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." Alice
replied, "'The question is whether you can make words mean so many different things." The
EGG replied. "'The question is which is to be master-that's all." Alice was puzzled by the
E(; just as we are pu/iled by the WCA.
67. R. DICKFRSON, TuF FUNDAMFNTAI.S OF LFGAi DRAFTING, 103-104 (Little, Brown
& Co. 190'5).
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not provided with consumer credit.
Legal analysts agree that the specialized definitions are prob-
lem areas. One commentator foresees that:
These circular definitions probably will cause far more confusion
than assistance in determining precisely who falls under the cov-
erage of the Act and what transactions will be covered, . . . the
Act would have been easier to understand if some of these terms
had not been defined at all, or at least defined without circular
references."
As we have seen, the Legislature has found it necessary to
exclude by specific exemption security dealers and the credit which
they extend to their customers who purchase stocks and bonds due
to these definitional problems.
Another example of drafting errors resulting in destructive
ambiguities is found in section 422.204(l)(a) which computes de-
ferral charges. The deferral charge may equal "the portion of the
precomputed finance charge attributable to the final installment of
the original schedule of payments times the number of installments
deferred times the number of months deferred." 9 In the context
of the WCA, "finance charge attributable" may have any one of
three or more meanings. It could mean "attributable" by the con-
tract rate, "attributable" by the disclosed Annual Percentage
Rate, or "attributable" by the Rule of 78 rebate required for pre-
payment in full. Only one familiar with credit laws would know
that the third choice probably was intended. No one could guess
what the courts would say. A Banking Department Rule may alle-
viate the problem. It declares that the finance charge attributable
to the final installment period shall be determined by the Rule of
78 thereby implying that the finance charge attributable to other
installments also shall be determined by the Rule of 78.70 Further,
section 426.104(4)(a) provides in effect that no penalty imposed by
the WCA shall apply to any act done or omitted to be done in
accordance with any rule, order, opinion, or statement of the
Banking Department, notwithstanding that a court later reverses
the Banking Department. The Banking Department Rule together
with section 426.104(4)(a) of the WCA should protect creditors
from penalties for computing deferral charges by the Rule of 78.
68. E. Heiser, Wisconsin Consumer Act-A Critical Analysis, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 389
(1974).
69. WIS. STAT. § 422.204(I)(a) (1971).
70. See note 22 supra.
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However, it will not protect creditors from the possibility that a
court will hold the Banking Department's rule invalid. If a court
should hold that the Banking Department's rule permitting Rule
of 78 deferral charges is invalid, creditors must change their con-
tract forms and procedures to comply with the court's interpreta-
tion of section 422.204(l)(a).
Section 422.203, regarding delinquency charges, contains an-
other destructive ambiguity. Under the Discount Loan Law7' and
similar laws in other states, delinquency charges are limited to
"precomputed", "discounted", or "add-on" contracts, but the
WCA delinquency provisions are not so limited.
Under the above types of contracts, the total finance charge for
payment according to schedule is contracted for when the loan is
made, subject to rebate for prepayment in full and additional
charges for default or deferment. A precomputed finance charge
is "precomputed" at the simple interest unpaid balance rate or
rates on scheduled monthly balances for the contract period. A
"discount" and "add-on" finance charge is for the contract period
without regard to installment payments. Add-on is computed on
and added to the original amount financed. Discount is computed
on and deducted from the face amount of the note and the
remainder is the original amount financed. Default charges are
appropriate for defaults in paying "precomputed," "discounted,"
or "add-on" contracts but not appropriate for defaults in paying
simple interest contracts. The WCA rate for licensed lenders is a
mixture of "discount" charges or equivalent simple interest rates
up to $3,000 and simple interest rates which may be precomputed
for loans over $3,000.
Section 422.203 as to delinquency charges is not limited to
precomputed and discounted contracts. The resulting ambiguity
may be that section 422.203 either permits delinquency charges to
be added to simple interest charges earned on delinquent balance
or limits the amount of simple interest on delinquent balances.
There are other possibilities. Litigation may be necessary to re-
solve this ambiguity, because the Banking Department has not yet
issued a rule.
Section 422.204 referring to deferral charges avoids this ambi-
guity because it is limited to precomputed or discounted contracts
so that it does not apply to simple interest contracts. Section
71. WIs. STAT. § 138.09 (1971).
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422.203 could have been made equally clear. Fortunately, this de-
structive ambiguity does not apply to licensed lenders, but it may
complicate installment contracts and default procedures of banks,
merchants, doctors, hospitals, and perhaps other creditors.
Section 422.208, which refers to interlocking loans and sales,
combined with section 425.209 which refers to deficiency judg-
ments, results in ambiguities and uncertainties which may be delib-
erate rather than the result of drafting errors. Under section
422.408, there is "an 'interlocking consumer loan' if the creditor
knows or has reason to know that all or a meaningful part of the
proceeds of the loan are used to pay all or part of the customer's
obligations to the seller. . ." and, if any one of several other facts
occurs. The consequences to a cash lender of making an "inter-
locking consumer loan" are that the borrower-buyer may assert
against the cash lender claims and defenses which the borrower-
buyer may have against the seller. Section 425.209 prohibits a
deficiency judgment for any interlocked loan or any interlocked
unpaid loan balance of $1,000 or less. There are other conse-
quences. There are limitations which may spare the lender for
some of the consequences. There is no doubt, however, that when
suit is filed to collect a dealer-referred loan, there may be jury
questions as to whether there was an interlock imposing the conse-
quences of Sections 422.208 and 425.209 on some part or all of the
unpaid balance. These sections give rights to borrower-buyers far
beyond rights of a cash-paying non-borrowing buyer.
Sections 425.103 through 425.105 contain a complex definition
of "default" and complex regulations of default procedures which
must be complied with before creditors may bring legal action to
collect the debt or recover security. If a "customer" is in "default,"
as defined in the Act, the debtor has 15 days to "cure" his default.72
Only if the customer does not cure his default may the creditor sue
the customer or bring other legal action to recover the collateral.
In the case of monthly installment contracts, a "default" does not
arise until there is "outstanding two or more scheduled payments
which have remained unpaid for more than 10 days after their
original or deferred due dates, ' 73 unless the default arises in pay-
ing the first or last installment. Different "Humpty-Dumptys"
apply to agricultural payments on agricultural credit and to pay-
72. Id. at § 425.105.
73. Id. at § 425.103(2)(a)"
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ments due at intervals of more than sixty days.74 These WCA
restrictions may have some unexpected effects on legitimate efforts
to collect legitimate consumer debts and might also be stretched
to apply even to non-consumer debts.
Subchapter II of chapter 423 of the WCA which defines and
regulates "consumer approval transactions" could have unex-
pected effects. This subchapter was designed to protect ordinary
people from high pressure door-to-door salesmen. However, it may
go beyond door-to-door sales. Section 423.201 defines "consumer
approval transactions." Depending on one's emphasis when
reading section 423.201 and associated definitions which the sec-
tion incorporates, it is possible that "consumer approval transac-
tions" could include many loan and credit sales contracts which are
made by mail. The term "consumer approval transactions" may
also include some cash sales made by mail for which the purchaser
pays more than $25. If a transaction falls under the confines of a
"consumer approval transaction" the consequences are that it is
subject to cancellations within three business days, subject to a
notice requirement and related requirements, unless the "cus-
tomer" certifies that immediate service is necessary.
DESTRUCTIVE ERRORS OF JUDGMENT-RATE AND COLLECTIONS
The drafters of the WCA were guilty of major errors of judg-
nient with respect to the economics of the consumer finance busi-
ness, especially in their reliance on the National Consumer Act.75
The National Consumer Act was drafted solely by consumer advo-
cates whose knowledge of consumer credit was really very limited.
Their experience was with people who qualify for free legal repre-
sentation for legal aid societies and OEO lawyers. They saw con-
suner credit through the eyes of a tiny fraction of all who incur
consumer debt. It would serve no useful purpose to review in detail
all the errors ofjudgment, but the errors relating to rates of charge
and collections will be mentioned to allude to the other errors.
The Wisconsin rate which applies to licensed lenders and their
cash installment loans for smaller amounts up to $500 is low in
comparison with the corresponding maximum rates in other states
and in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. In terms of annual
percentage interest rates, the maximum is 21.11% per year com-
74. Id.
75. A Proposal of the National Consumer Law Center, Boston College Law School.
Brighton. Mas;. (Jan. 1970).
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puted by the actuarial method on scheduled unpaid balances of
loans up to $700. This annual percentage rate of 21.11% is equal
to the annual discount rate of 9.5% authorized by Wisconsin
Statutes section 138.09 when the loan contract is paid in 24 equal
and consecutive monthly installments of principal and discount
combined. For cash installment loans up to $300 or $500, the Wis-
consin rates which apply to licensed lenders are 25% less than the
corresponding rates of 43 other states. The Wisconsin rates for
revolving loan or sale credit are less than the corresponding rates
in 26 other states. Forty-two states authorize higher rates than
WCA rates for installment sales of consumer goods (other than
motor vehicles). 76
The WCA imposes restrictions on creditors' collection reme-
dies which are not imposed, by the Code and which were not pre-
viously imposed by Wisconsin law.
The business of consumer credit involves risk of loss, operating
expense, and costs of raising money which are well known to those
who are in the business but which may not be recognized by others.
There is in fact a very small margin of profit to creditors. A small
increase in a creditor's cost of borrowed money, a small increase
in his operating expense, a small increase in bad debts, or a small
insufficiency in the rate of charge would move the creditor from
profit to loss. The narrow profit margin is demonstrated by annual
statistics published by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Banking as
to operations of licensed lenders under sections 138.07 and 138.09.
The report for 1972 shows that licensed lenders invested in loans
for the year an average of $274,852,255 and their profit was only
$5,714,378. Their net profit was only 2.08% for the year of their
76. The Wisconsin maximum rates referred to are fixed by Wis. STAT. § 138.09(7)
(1971) as amended by Wis. LAWS 1972, ch. 239 § 9 and Wis. STAT. § 422.201 (1971). The
maximum rates established in Wisconsin and other states by consumer finance loan laws,
sales linance. revolving credit, usury, and allied laws are stated in the pamphlet entitled.
SUMMARY OF STATE CONSUMER CREDIT LAWS AND RATES, compiled by the authors of this
article -as of Jan. 1973. With respect to licensed lenders (consumer finance loan laws), the
Summary shows 48 states which permit higher rates than Wisconsin allows. The maximum
rates authori/ed by Delaware, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont are
higher than Wisconsin rates but less than 25% higher. With respect to revolving loan or sale
credit, the 26 states which allow higher rates than Wisconsin are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louis-
iana. Michigan, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon. Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. With respect to installments
sales of goods, only two states impose lower rates by statute than the Wisconsin rates
(Penns)lvania and Washington); several states do not impose any maximum rates. The
Arkansas Constitution sets a maximum interest rate of 10% per annum.
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average investment in loans for the year and 11.02% of gross in-
come. The bad debt expense for the same year (including write-offs
and additional reserves) was $4,974,036 which was nearly 10% of
gross income.
7
'
It is apparent that a decline in the collectibility of loans would
sharply reduce the profit and could move the business from net
prolit to net loss. The drafters of the WCA may have overlooked
these facts when they imposed new restrictions on creditors' right
to collect from their customers. Among the new WCA restrictions
are the following:
(1) Self-help repossession of security without judicial process
is prohibited. Judgment in action for replevin must be obtained to
repossess security. 7 A voluntary surrender of security by the
debtor is not "voluntary" if the creditor has requested the
surrender. 711
(2) When the unpaid balance of a credit sale or an interlock-
ing loan is $1,000 or less at time of default, the creditor may not
repossess the security and also obtain a deficiency judgment; and
if the creditor obtains judgment without repossessing, the creditor
may not levy on the security to enforce the judgment80 The unpaid
balance at time of default rather than the original amount financed
determines the application of this prohibition. The prohibition ap-
plies to credit sales and interlocking loans as large as $25,000 when
the unpaid balance is $1,000 or less at time of default.
(3) Lenders are prohibited from having security in most
household furniture except purchase money security and are pro-
hibited from levying on it to enforce a judgment.8
(4) The debtor's equity in his home to the extent of $15,000
is exempt from levy.8 ' This exemption is in addition to the home-
stead exemption of $10,000.
(5) The minimum exemption of wages from garnishment is
forty times the federal minimum hourly wage plus fifteen dollars
per dependent.": This adds fifteen dollars per week for each depen-
dent of the debtor to the minimum exemption established by the
Code.
77. A'jNNUAi RFI'ORT 01 Till; WISCONSIN BANKING DFPT. FOR 1973. at pp. 12-14.
78. Wi,. SrAT. \ 425.205, 425.206 (1971).
79. h& at § 425.204.
80. I& at § 425.209.
81. IL at . 422.17. 425.106.
82. IL at § 425.106.
83. hi.
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(6) The creditor is prohibited from filing suit to collect
monthly installment contracts until two installments are in default
more than ten days and the creditor has given the debtor a fifteen
day notice.81 Different minimum default periods are prescribed for
the first. and last installment, installment periods exceeding two
months, credit for agricultural purposes, and open-end credit.
(7) A lender may be liable for claims or defenses which a
borrower may have against a seller if the lender knows that a
"meaningful part" of the loan is paid to the seller and if the lender
knows that the seller has failed to perform contracts. There are
other facts which may subject the lender to liability. The lender's
liability may not exceed the amount of the loan; it is limited to the
unpaid balance when the lender has notice of the borrower-buyer's
claim or defense, unless the borrower-buyer has an unsatisfied
judgment against the seller. If only part of the loan was paid to
the seller, the lender's liability is based on that part of the loan
rather than the whole loan. 85
(8) The Banking Department may promulgate rules to pro-
hibit "unconscionable" collection.86
(9) There is a list of statements which a creditor is prohibited
from making when communicating with a delinquent debtor, or his
employer, relatives, or others.87
CLASS ACTIONS FOR PENALTIES
The WCA allows the Banking Department or any credit cus-
tomer to bring class actions for civil penalties as well as actual
damages.88 The civil penalties for violation are very heavy. Some
violations make the contract void and allow the debtor to keep the
proceeds of the contract. Other violations allow debtors to recover
twice the finance charge subject to a minimum of $100 and a
maximum of $1,000. In all cases, the credit customer may recover
attorneys' fees when the court holds there is a violation. 9 In the
recent opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," Judge Medina,
speaking for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
recognized such a class action could result in what has been called
84. hi. at § 425.103, 425.104,.425.105.
85. Id. at § 422.408.
86. IL at § 426.108.
87. Id. at § 427.104.
88. Id. at § 426.110.
89. IU at §N 425.302-425.305.
90. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
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"legalized blackmail."'" The drafters of the WCA not only adopted
the broad provisions of Federal Rule 23 on class actions, but added
a number of ambiguous provisions.
In a large number of purported class actions alleging violations
of the Federal Truth-In-Lending Act, class actions have been de-
nied because courts did not believe that Congress could have per-
mitted penalties for violations to be recovered in class actions.
Judge Frankel in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,
92
noted that such a recovery "would be a horrendous, possibility
annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported
class . . .': Yet, section 426.110(14) permits class actions for
penalties, unless the businessman can show that the violation was
not "willful and knowing." It was an error in judgement to permit
class actions for penalties in any situation; and the addition of
vague language will necessitate prolonged litigation to determine
its meaning."
Section 426.104(4) of the Act, permitting the Banking Depart-
ment to approve creditors' practices, will be of some help in lessen-
ing the problems of determining what must be done to comply with
the Act, but the Banking Department cannot approve every possi-
ble aspect of business practice.
CONCLUSION
The restrictions in the WCA on creditors' rights are so severe
and frequently so ambiguous that creditors generally may curtail
credit to consumers and some creditors may be unwilling to take
91. hd. at 10o19. citing Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations
in lit t .uts. 71 Cotuxi. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971).
92. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
93. IdL at 416.
94. Since this article was begun, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit vacated its decision allowing a class action to recover Truth-In-Lending penalties
and ordered a rehearing en bane. The Carte Blanche petition cites thirty-four U.S. District
Court opinions as to Truth-In-Lending class actions for civil penalties, stating that "in all
but three of them. these courts have uniformly held that class action treatment is improper
in such a Truth-In-Lending class action." Vacation and rehearing was granted June 20,
1973.
In another cse. a federal district judge required the plaintiffs to waive the $100 mini-
mum penalty imposed by the Truth-In-Lending Act as a precedent to bringing a class action
for alleged violations of the Truth-In-Lending Act. Eovaldi v. First National Bank of
Chicago. 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. III. 1973).
See alo. Garwood, Trtth-ht-Lending A Regulator's View, 29 Bus. LAWYER, 193,201
(1973). Mr. G(arwood shows that the score in federal district courts is 16 decisions which
did not permit class actions and eleven decisions which did permit class actions. Mr Gar-
" ood', score may have been compiled before June 20.
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the risk. It may be a long time before we learn the economic effects
of these restrictions. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine their economic effects on the basis of statistics. One by one
each restriction may seem reasonable when considered by itself
without -regard to the other restrictions. It is the cumulative effect
rather than the one-by-one effect, which makes the WCA so se-
vere.

